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German Codetermination without Nationalization, and British Nationalization without 
Codetermination: Retelling the Story 
 
Rebecca Zahn 
 
Codetermination  W worker participation in management  W forms part of the industrial 
relations traditions of a number of European countries.
1
 Among these, the German system 
of parity codetermination (paritätische Mitbestimmung)  W the focus of this article  W provides 
the greatest level of involvement for workers by allowing for equal representation of 
employees and management on the supervisory boards of companies in certain industries 
and above specific size thresholds. This model of codetermination was first introduced in the 
iron and steel industries by the British military command after the Second World War and is 
widely regarded in the German literature as a successful trade-union achievement and a vital 
                                                 
The author would like to thank Douglas Brodie for his advice, Peter Zahn for insightful 
discussions on the topic, and the editor for helpful comments. The author is grateful to the 
^ŽĐŝĞƚǇŽĨ>ĞŐĂů^ĐŚŽůĂƌƐ ?ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ&ƵŶĚĨŽƌŝƚƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƌĐŚŝǀĂů
research which underpins this article, and to the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, the National 
ƌĐŚŝǀĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇDƵƐĞƵŵ ?dŚĞƵƐƵĂůĚŝƐĐůĂŝŵĞƌƐĂƉƉůǇ ? 
 
1
 Worker representation at the workplace can either take place through trade unions, works 
councils or at board level. Within the European Union, eighteen member-states make 
statutory provision for some form of board-level representation. Of these, the German 
system of equal representation of workers and employer representatives on the supervisory 
board of the coal, and iron and steel industries, provides the greatest level of involvement. 
See L. Fulton, Worker Representation in Europe (Labour Research Department and ETUI: 
2013) available at http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Across-
Europe/Board-level-Representation2. For a broader definition and discussion of the term 
 ‘DŝƚďĞƐƚŝŵŵƵŶŐ WŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞD ?tĞŝƐƐ ?European Employment and Industrial 
Relations Glossary: Germany (Sweet and Maxwell: 1992), pp. 227 W8. 
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element,
2
 ĞǀĞŶƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ‘ƐŽĐŝŽ-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉŽƐƚ-war industrial 
democracy.
3
  
However, a closer reading of the British accounts of the negotiations among the 
Allied powers over ownership of the coal and steel industries raises the question as to why 
codetermination was introduced when the ultimate goal of British policy is repeatedly 
outlined as nationalization of heavy industry.
4
 One must therefore ask whether 
codetermination was intended as a form of industrial democracy or whether it was actually a 
British compromise and a first step on the road to the goal of nationalization of these 
industries (which was never completed). Parallels  W which have largely been overlooked but 
which help to explain the reasons for the introduction of codetermination  W can be drawn 
with the debates taking place in the UK with regard to the programme of nationalization 
initiated by the new Labour government, elected in July 1945.  
However, there were repeated attempts to delay the nationalization of the iron and 
steel industries for economic reasons until at least after the general election in 1950. Yet any 
postponement was seen as irreconcilable with the British insistence on the nationalization of 
the German iron and steel industries,
5
 lending weight to the argument that the introduction 
of codetermination in Germany should be considered a stepping stone to nationalization. 
This article considers not only why codetermination was not introduced in the UK when 
similar debates on codetermination and nationalization were taking place at the same time, 
but also whether the failure to institute a system of worker participation in management in 
the UK should be considered a missed opportunity.  
 
 
                                                 
2
 There is only limited archival material and historical literature documenting the 
negotiations that resulted in the adoption of Mitbestimmung. The most detailed and 
influential account was written by E. Potthoff, Der Kampf um die Montanmitbestimmung 
(Bund-Verlag, Köln: 1957) who as head of the West German trade-ƵŶŝŽŶĐŽŶĨĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
(DGB) economic research institute (Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Institut) between 1946 
and 1949 played an influential role in the elaboration and implementation of the concept. 
See also H. Thum¸ Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie (DVA, Stuttgart: 1982) and G. 
Müller, Mitbestimmung in der Nachkriegszeit (Schwan, Düsseldorf: 1987). 
3
 Ibid ? ?Ɖ ? ? P ‘ĚŝĞďĞĚĞƵƚƐĂŵƐƚĞƐŽǌŝĂůƉŽůŝƚŝƐĐŚĞEĞƵĞƌƵŶŐŝŶĚer Geschichte der 
Bundesrepublik. ? 
4
 See A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin: Vol. 3, Foreign Secretary 1945 W1951 
(Heinemann: 1983), ch. 11. 
5
 See H. Pelling, The Labour Governments 1945 W51 (Macmillan: 1984). 
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Iron and steel in post-war Germany: attempts at nationalization 
 
Codetermination in the form of some sort of employee representation in German 
enterprises had existed in different forms since the 1890s.
6
 It was formally provided for in 
legislation with the introduction of the Works Council Act (Betriebsrätegesetz) in 1920.
7
 
However, as Grebing points out,  
 
the double task imposed on the works councils [during this period] proved extremely 
difficult, if not altogether impossible; they ǁĞƌĞƚŽ “ůŽŽŬĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐǀŝƐăǀŝƐƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ? ?ĂŶĚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ? “ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĨƵůĨŝůŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ?8 
 
The Act was repealed by the Nazi government in 1934 and replaced with an Act for the 
organization of national labour (Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit) which abolished 
any kind of codetermination.  
After the Second World War and the unconditional surrender and military occupation 
of Germany by the four Allied powers,
9
 economic production  W especially in the German 
coal, and iron and steel industries  W was at the heart of much of the Allied discussions.10 
France objected fundamentally to the restoration of German industry to its old levels of 
                                                 
6
 For an overview of the history of ƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĞĞZ ?
ƵŬĞƐ ? ‘dŚĞKƌŝŐŝŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶ^ǇƐƚĞŵŽĨtŽƌŬĞƌZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?Historical Studies in 
Industrial Relations (HSIR) 19 (2005), pp. 31 W62.   
7
 L. F. Neumann and K. Schaper, Die Sozialordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2008), p. 33. 
8
 H. Grebing, The History of the German Labour Movement (Oswald Wolff: 1969), p. 107. 
9
 After its unconditional surrender on 7/8 May 1945, Germany was divided into four 
occupation zones which were governed by the Allied Control Council, set up as an 
overarching control body able to issue laws, directives, orders, and proclamations. The 
Council was run by the UK, the USA, France, and the Soviet Union. The four occupation zones 
were controlled at an administrative level by the Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone 
&ƌĂŶĕĂŝƐĞĚ ?KĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ (GMZFO) (France), the Control Commission for Germany (British 
Element) (UK), the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) (USA), and the 
Soviet Military Administration in Germany (Soviet Union). For a detailed overview see 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Errichtung der Besatzungsherrschaft (2005) available 
at http://www.bpb.de/izpb/10048/errichtung-der-besatzungsherrschaft?p=1.  
10
 For an overview of the rationale behind British military and economic policy, particularly 
with regard to the denazification of large enterprises, see Thum, Mitbestimmung, pp. 26 W31 
and the references at pp. 27 W8.  
 4 
production which it saw ĂƐĂƌĞŶĞǁĞĚƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽŝƚƐŽǁŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?11 Its 
representatives argued instead for the separation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr from 
Germany, or at least for the internationalization of the Ruhr so that its coal resources could 
be used to build ƵƉƚŚĞŚĞĂǀǇŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌƐĂŶĚƐŽĂǀŽŝĚƌĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĨŽƌŵĞƌŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞh^ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ?ĚŝĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĂĐŽŵŵŽŶ
position. The War Department proposed that ownership should be vested in German 
trustees until a German central government was established, and the German people could 
ǀŽƚĞŽŶƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŵŽƌĞ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĂĨƚĞƌĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐ ?ǇǁĂǇŽĨ
contrast, the State Department supported the French position that German industry should 
be included in a European recovery programme. From the outset, however, the 
decentralization of German industry formed a key part of Allied policy.
12
  
In the British sector where most heavy industry was located, the initial focus was 
decentralization of indusƚƌǇ ?ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĚĞŶĂǌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚƵƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝƚŝƐŚ
policy in denazifying German industry was two-pronged: first, to investigate and, where a 
ĐĂƐĞĞǆŝƐƚĞĚ ?ƚŽĚŝƐŵŝƐƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ?ƚŽƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐ ? ?13 
From an economic point of view, the British were keen for German industry to play a vital 
role in ensuring German economic recovery so as to lessen the financial pressure on the UK 
as an occupying power. Heavy industry, particularly iron and steel which was controlled by a 
handful of companies, was to be restructured and broken up into smaller entities. In July 
1946, Sholto Douglas, Commander of the British Zone in Germany, on the basis of plans 
outlined by Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, to the Cabinet early in 1946, 
announced plans for the eventual nationalization (or socialization as it was referred to) of 
the main German industries. There is doubt in the German literature as to whether the 
British were serious in their pursuit of nationalization
14
 as the policy did not seem to 
ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh< ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŽĨŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?15 
                                                 
11
 Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, ch. 7. 
12
 See the Potsdam Agreement in Mitteilungen über die Dreimächtekonferenz, Europa-
Archiv, pp. 216 W17. 
13
 F. Taylor, Exorcising Hitler (Bloomsbury: 2011), p. 308. 
14
 ^ĞĞt ?ZƵĚǌŝŽ ? ‘ŝe ausgebliebene Sozialisierung an Rhein und Ruhr. Zur 
Sozialisierungspolitik von Labour-Regierung und SPD 1945 W ? ? ? ? ?Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 
(1978) , pp. 1 W ? ? ?, ?>ĂĚĞŵĂĐŚĞƌ ? ‘ŝĞďƌŝƚŝƐĐŚĞ^ŽǌŝĂůŝƐŝĞƌƵŶŐƐƉŽůŝƚŝŬŝŵZŚĞŝŶ-Ruhr-Raum 
1945 W ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶ ?^ĐŚarf and H. J. Schröder (eds), Die Deutschlandpolitik Großbritanniens und 
die britische Zone 1945 W1949 (Steiner Franz Verlag, Wiesbaden: 1979),  pp. 51 W92. 
15
 Müller, Mitbestimmung, p. 31. 
 5 
Nationalization would imply a change in management which would initially lead to a 
fall in output rather than making Germany less reliant on British financial support, and, 
moreover, the British made few attempts in practice to pursue nationalization.
16
 Following 
this line of reasoning, the seizure of the iron and steel companies in August 1946 and their 
placement under the control of the British-administered North German Iron and Steel 
Control Authority (NGISC) should be seen as a temporary measure in order to better 
organizĞƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛdecentralization rather than as an act of nationalization.17 While the 
British did pursue decentralization of the sector from 1946 onwards, this occurred in parallel 
to ongoing negotiations between the UK, the USA, and France over possible 
nationalization.
18
 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉŝĐƚƵƌĞĞŵĞƌŐĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĞǀŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽ
nationalization becomes obvious. In an article written for The Times in 1977, William Harris-
Burland, the British official in Germany responsible for the decentralization of German 
industry, recalled: 
 
In 1946 I was appointed controller of the steel concerns in the British zone of control, 
with instructions to reorganize and deconcentrate them in fulfilment of a 
requirement in the Potsdam agreement. To this was later added a quasi-secret 
instruction to prepare the steel industry for nationalization.
19
 
 
There is also clear evidence that in proposing nationalization, Bevin was heavily influenced 
ďǇƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ,20 and in particular by left-
wing supporters of the British Labour Party.
21
 This is not surprising as Bevin had been active 
in British industrial relations before the war as general secretary of the Transport and 
'ĞŶĞƌĂůtŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?hŶŝŽŶ ?d'th )ĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŚĞůĚƚŚĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĨŽƌ
                                                 
16
 t ?ĚĞůƐŚĂƵƐĞƌ ? ‘ŝĞǀĞƌŚŝŶĚĞƌƚĞEĞƵŽƌĚŶƵŶŐ ?tŝƌƚƐĐŚĂĨƚƐŽƌĚŶƵŶŐƵŶĚ 
^ŽǌŝĂůƐƚĂĂƚƐƉƌŝŶǌŝƉŝŶĚĞƌEĂĐŚŬƌŝĞŐƐǌĞŝƚ ?Politische Bildung (1976), pp. 53 W72.  
17
 Müller, Mitbestimmung, p. 32. 
18
 For an overview of decentralization see Thum, Mitbestimmung, pp. 31 W7. 
19
 W. Harris-ƵƌůĂŶĚ ? ‘tŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ZŽůĞŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?The Times, 27 January 1977. 
20
 See Pelling, The Labour Governments, ch. 5. 
21
 See E. Schmidt, Die verhinderte Neuordnung 1945 W1952 (Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 
Frankfurt a.M.: 1971), p. 84.  
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Labour and National Service from 1940 to 1945,
22
 before becoming Foreign Secretary in 
1945, and he continued to be involved in British domestic politics.  
/ŶƉƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?ĞǀŝŶƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚĨŝƌƐƚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĂŶĞǁ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ?
ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂǀǇŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚ ‘ďĞŵĂĚĞŝŶƚŽĂƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐĞĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ
whose relation to the Provincial Government would be the same as that of the National Coal 
ŽĂƌĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƚŽ,D' ?,ŝƐDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ?23 This proposal was not accepted 
by the USA and France, both of which favoured the internationalization of the Ruhr. 
Nonetheless, ůĂƚĞƌƚŚĂƚǇĞĂƌ ?ŝŶƵŐƵƐƚ ?ĞǀŝŶ ‘ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞ
ƉƵďůŝĐŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶŚĞĂǀǇŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?24 ĂŶĚĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ‘ƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞƐĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŽǁŶĞĚĂŶĚǁŽƌŬĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?25 The transfer of the 
iron and steel industries to the control of the NGISC should therefore be considered a first 
step towards nationalization. This is supported by the reaction of the German metal 
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƵŶŝŽŶƚŽ the creation of the NGISC when it ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ‘ĂƐƚŚĞĨŝrst step 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚĞĂǀǇŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ
'ĞƌŵĂŶƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞE'/^ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝĨĂĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
nationalization were to succeed.
26
 
Disputes between the Allied powers over the nature and form of nationalization 
continued into the autumn of 1947. In the hope of appeasing the Gouvernement Militaire de 
ůĂŽŶĞ&ƌĂŶĕĂŝƐĞĚ ?KĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ (GMZFO) which was vehemently opposed to any form of 
nationalization, Bevin repeatedly clarified that he did not advocate the transfer of the 
industries to a German government,
27
 but argued in favour of decentralization and the 
vesting of industry ownership in the new Land Nordrhein-tĞƐƚĨĂůĞŶ ?ĞǀŝŶ ?ƐŵĂŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
supporters over this issue were tŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ǁĞƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇǁĞĚĚĞĚƚŽ
the idea of public ownership and were afraid that, if measures of socialisation were not 
                                                 
22
 See A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin: Volume 1, Trade Union Leader 1881 W
1940 (Heinemann: 1960). 
23
 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the Ruhr and West Germany 
circulated to the Cabinet, 15 April 1946, CAB 129/8/39, The National Archives (TNA), Kew 
London. 
24
 Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, p. 320. 
25
 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Germany, 17 October 1946, 
CAB 129/13/33, Conclusions and Recommendations, TNA. 
26
 Schmidt, Die verhinderte Neuordnung,  p. 76. 
27
 This would have not only upset France which was fearful of the recreation of a strong 
German state but there was also a perceived danger of a future German government falling 
under Communist-Russian Control. See Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, pp. 340 W3. 
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carried out quickly, there was a danger of the ownership of these industries with their 
dangerous war potentiaůƌĞǀĞƌƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞĐŽŵďŝŶĞƐ ? ?28 British trade unions were of 
course also heavily influenced by the domestic debate taking place in the UK over the 
nationalization of heavy industry, which they actively endorsed (see below). 
French and especially American opposition to nationalization were pivotal in securing 
its eventual failure.
29
 From an American perspective, nationalization would hamper the 
ZƵŚƌ ?ƐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŽƵƚƉƵƚ ?ĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐǀŝƚĂůĨŽƌďƌŽĂĚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
economic recovery. TŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ? ‘ŽďũĞĐƚĞĚĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇƚŽƚŚĞ
restoration of German industry to its old levels of production which they saw as a renewed 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ‘ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZŚŝŶĞ-
and and the ZƵŚƌĨƌŽŵ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ŽƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZƵŚƌ ? ?30 In 
August 1947, during tripartite talks between the British, Americans and French which took 
place at a time when the UK could no longer afford to financially support its German zone 
and was heavily indebted to the USA, Bevin eventually agreed to an American compromise: 
 
The joint communiqué issued at the end of the coal talks, on 10 September, 
transferred responsibility for coal production to German hands under the supervision 
of a joint US/UK control group. The question of ownership of the mines was left 
open, but when the two military governments published their Law No. 75 for the 
reorganization of both the German coal and steel industries, two months later, 
ownership, in both cases, was vested in German trustees pending a final decision by 
 ‘a representative, freely-elected German government. ?31  
 
Whereas the compromise kept open the possibility of future nationalization, it took the 
process out of British hands, and plans for nationalization were eventually shelved. What 
remains of the aim of socialization is Mitbestimmung ?Žƌ ?ĂƐƵůůŽĐŬǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? ‘ƚŚĞůĞŐĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞ
British occupation was not, as Bevin had hoped, the nationalization of the German coal and 
steel industries but the institution of Mitbestimmung (codetermination between 
                                                 
28
 Lew Douglas (US Ambassador) report to US Secretary of State, 4 July 1947. Foreign 
Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1947 (3) p. 312. 
29
 Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, ch. 11. 
30
 Ibid., p. 431. 
31
 Ibid., p. 435 citing the text of the communiqué in RIIA Documents 1947 W48, pp. 622 W3 and 
of Law No. 75, pp. 637 W45. 
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ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŝƚƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ŚĂƐƐƚŝůůƚŽ
ďĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?32 Similarly, Harris-ƵƌůĂŶĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŽƐĞŝŶƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌ
Government who had been advocating nationalization of the German steel industry, when 
they saw their aim to be unattainable, were prepared to console themselves with 
ĐŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ? ?33  
 
 
Iron and steel in post-war Germany: the introduction of codetermination 
 
Reconstituted German trade unions
34
 had begun to call for the institutionalization of 
Mitbestimmung  W which they associated with the equal status of workers and employers in 
the management of enterprises  W as early as March 1946 at their first post-war congress.35 
Influenced by plans for a reorganization of the German economy drawn up by exiled German 
trade-unionists based in the UK during the Second World War,
36
 German trade unions 
supported codetermination to control the employers, and to obtain a role in the regulation 
ŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƚĞƌŵƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ?/ƚǁĂƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨ
codetermination should be granted to works councils or trade unions. While the general 
tenor of the congress spoke of works councils being granted rŝŐŚƚƐŽĨ ‘ĐŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂůů
                                                 
32
 Ibid., pp. 435 W6. 
33
 Harris-Burland, The Times, 27 January 1977. 
34
 As a result of military restrictions on the right to freedom of association in the early post-
war years (Industrial Relations Directive No. 1, 1945), trade unions were initially 
concentrated at a local level. The first trade-union confederation within the British zone was 
not formed until April 1947. In parallel, a group of former union leaders from the Weimar 
Republic had come together to form a committee (Siebener-Ausschuß) led by Hans Böckler in 
March 1945. This committee operated as the voice of local trade unions and acted as 
principal contact for the British government and military leaders. See G. Müller, 
Mitbestimmung, p. 68. For an overview of the state of German trade-unionism in the late 
1940s see Grebing, History, pp. 172 W82. 
35
 Protokoll der ersten Gewerkschaftskonferenz der britischen Zone vom 12. W14. März 1946, 
Hannover.  
36
 Schmidt, Die verhinderte Neuordnung, p. 67. ^ĞĞĂůƐŽ' ?^ƚƵƚƚĂƌĚ ? ‘ŽŽŬZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ ?
Dartmann, Redistribution of Power: Joint Consultation or Productivity Coalitions? Labour and 
Postwar Reconstruction in Germany and Britain, 1945 W1953  ?ƌŽĐŬŵĞǇĞƌ ?ŽĐŚƵŵ P ? ? ? ? ) ? ?
HSIR 15 (2003), 147 W51 who references the document at p. 149. For a more detailed 
overview of the rationale behind German trade-ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐƐĞĞ ?ĂƌƚŵĂŶŶ ?Re-
Distribution of Power, Joint Consultation or Productivity Coalitions (Brockmeyer, Bochum: 
1996), pp. 94 W147. 
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social and labour law related matters of the enterprise and of responsible collaboration and 
ĐŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĂƌĞĂƐŽĨƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽĨŝƚƐ ? ?37 Hans Böckler  W 
president of the German trade-union confederation in the British Zone  W firmly argued in 
favour of trade unions taking on such a role: 
 
We really cannot leave the employers alone together in a room by themselves for a 
moment and if we have separate chambers [for the employer and the workers], then 
/ĐĂŶƚĞůůǇŽƵĞǆĂĐƚůǇǁŚĂƚǁŝůůŚĂƉƉĞŶ ? ?tĞŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚďĞĞƋƵĂůƐ ? ?^Ž/ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ PƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞ
management boards and supervisory boards of industry.
38
 
 
ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶĐĂůůŝŶŐĨŽƌ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĐŽdetermination for trade unions and works councils in 
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?39 was passed at the second trade-union congress held in December 1946 
In parallel, German trade unions called for a reorganization of the economy in which 
ŚĞĂǀǇŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ?Gemeineigentum) rather than outright 
nationalization.
40
 Codetermination was conceived as an integral part of such a 
ƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇďǇƚŚĞDĞƚĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?hŶŝŽŶ ?IGMetall) which represented 
workers in the iron and steel industries.
41
 The British Labour government was seen as an ally, 
and its plans for the decentralization of the iron and steel industries were considered to 
open up the possibility for trade unions to participate in industrial reorganization.
42
 In a 
                                                 
37
 Protokoll der ersten Gewerkschaftskonferenz der britischen Zone vom 12. W14. März 1946, 
,ĂŶŶŽǀĞƌ ?ŶƚƐĐŚůŝĞƘƵŶŐEƌ ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? P ‘ŝĞƐĞZĞĐŚƚĞ ?ĚĞƐĞƚƌŝĞďƐƌĂƚƐ ?ďĞƐƚĞŚĞŶŝŶĚĞƌ
Mitbestimmung der Betriebsräte in allen sozialen und arbeitsrechtlichen Angelegenheiten 
des Betriebes und der verantwortlichen Mitarbeit und Mitbestimmung bei der Produktion 
ƵŶĚĚĞƌsĞƌƚĞŝůƵŶŐĚĞƐƌƚƌĂŐƐ ? ? 
38
 Ibid., ,ĂŶƐƂĐŬůĞƌĂƚƉ ? ? ? P ‘tŝƌĚƺƌĨĞŶĂďĞƌĞŝŐĞŶƚůŝĐŚĚŝĞhŶƚĞƌŶĞŚŵĞƌŬĞŝŶĞŶ
Augenblick unter sich alleine lassen, und bei getrennten Kammern weiß ich genau, wie es 
ŬŽŵŵƚ ? ?tŝƌŵƺƐƐĞŶŝŶĚĞƌtŝƌƚschaft selber sein, also völlig gleichberechtigt vertreten 
ƐĞŝŶ ?ůƐŽĚĞƌ'ĞĚĂŶŬĞŝƐƚĚĞƌ PsĞƌƚƌĞƚƵŶŐŝŶĚĞŶsŽƌƐƚćŶĚĞŶƵŶĚƵĨƐŝĐŚƚƐƌćƚĞŶĚĞƌ
'ĞƐĞůůƐĐŚĂĨƚĞŶ ? ? 
39
 Schmidt, Die verhinderte Neuordnung, p. 71. 
40
 While nationalization involves the transfer of private property to state ownership, 
communal property implies public ownership of industry which is also publicly available. This 
can only be achieved through a democratization of an industry and its production processes 
through, for example, codetermination. 
41
 Thum, Mitbestimmung, p. 20. 
42
 Ibid., p. 25. 
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statement on the socialization of German industry, German trade unions called for equal 
participation of workers and management on the supervisory boards of industry.
43
 Harris-
ƵƌůĂŶĚƌĞĐĂůůƐƚŚĂƚƂĐŬůĞƌĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚƚŚĞE'/^ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŽƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ‘ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
appointments to [the decenƚƌĂůŝǌĞĚŝƌŽŶĂŶĚƐƚĞĞů ?ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŽƌǇĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ
ďŽĂƌĚƐƐŚŽƵůĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐĂŶĚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ?44 In negotiating 
over the future of the iron and steel industries, German trade unions adopted a conciliatory 
approach, offering their support for British plans for industrial reorganization and economic 
growth in return for organizational reform, including the introduction of codetermination.
45
  
ĨƚĞƌƂĐŬůĞƌ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ?ĨƌŽŵKĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞE'/^ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶƚƌĂĚe 
unions in the decentralization of the iron and steel industries. In addition, Harris-Burland 
appointed Rennie Smith  W a former Labour Party MP and trade-unionist fluent in German 
and English
46
  W as a mediator between the NGISC and the German trade unions. At a 
meeting between Harris-Burland for the NGISC, Heinrich Dinkelbach and Günter Max 
Paefgen as representatives of its German trustees (Treuhandverwaltung) and six trade-union 
representatives (including Böckler) on 14 December 1946, Dinkelbach outlined a plan, which 
had already been approved by the relevant British authorities in London and by the British 
military government in Berlin, to reorganize the iron and steel industries.
47
 Its principal 
objectives were to limit the sphere of influence of the current owners while also 
guaranteeing worker involvement in the management of the industries.
48
 As such, the 
ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐĂŝŵŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƚŽŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞ ‘ƚƌƵĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?49  
While Dinkelbach suggested that future negotiations with trade unions would clarify 
the extent of worker involvement in management, he suggested equal representation for 
workers and management on the supervisory boards of the iron and steel industries.
50
 The 
                                                 
43
  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘EŝĞĚĞƌƐĐŚƌŝĨƚƺďĞƌĚŝĞƵƐĂŵŵĞŶŬƵŶĨƚŵŝƚĚĞŶsĞƌƚƌĞƚĞƌŶĚĞƌ'ĞǁĞƌŬƐĐŚĂĨƚĞŶ ?
ĂƚŶůĂŐĞ ? P ‘^ƚĞůůƵŶŐŶĂŚŵĞĚĞƌ'ĞǁĞƌŬƐĐŚĂĨƚĞŶǌƵƌ^ŽǌŝĂůŝƐŝĞƌƵŶŐ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? 
44
 Harris-Burland, The Times, 27 January 1977. 
45
 Thum¸ Mitbestimmung, p. 26. 
46
 See M. Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International 
Relations 1854 W1945 (Oxford University Press: 2000), pp. 298 W ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘EŝĞĚĞƌƐĐŚƌŝĨƚ
über die Zusammenkunft mit ĚĞŶsĞƌƚƌĞƚĞƌŶĚĞƌ'ĞǁĞƌŬƐĐŚĂĨƚĞŶ ?ĂƚŶůĂŐĞ ? ? 
47
 Schmidt, Die verhinderte Neuordnung, p. 76. 
48
  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘EŝĞĚĞƌƐĐŚƌŝĨƚƺďĞƌĚŝĞƵƐĂŵŵĞŶŬƵŶĨƚŵŝƚĚĞŶsĞƌƚƌĞƚĞƌŶĚĞƌ'ĞǁĞƌŬƐĐŚĂĨƚĞŶ ?
at Anlage 1, p. 2. 
49
 Ibid., p. 4:  ‘Im Sinne einer wahren Wirtschaftsdemokratie werden die Rechte der Arbeiter 
in jeder Hinsicht gewahrt.  ‘ 
50
 Ibid., p. 3; see Schmidt, Die verhinderte Neuordnung, p. 77. 
 11 
detailed framework for this unprecedented form of codetermination was subsequently 
negotiated between trade unions
51
 and the Treuhandverwaltung, and finalized in January 
 ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚďŽĂƌĚǁĂƐƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂ ‘ůĂďŽƵƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ? ?Arbeitsdirektor) as one of 
its three members who could only be appointed with the agreement of the trade unions, 
and supervisory boards were to consist of eleven members, five of which were to represent 
the employer and the workers respectively,
52
 with the neutral chairman appointed by the 
Treuhandverwaltung. Industry owners were not involved in the negotiations and were only 
officially informed of the outcome in January 1947. Equal representation on supervisory 
boards was extended beyond the British military zone in April 1951 by an Act of the German 
Parliament (Gesetz über die paritätische Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie) to cover 
the coal, and iron and steel industries, and paved the way for the Works Constitution Act 
1952 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) which reintroduced works councils and extended worker 
representation on supervisory boards to other industries.
53
  
Müller argues that the owners, despite not being officially involved in the 
negotiations over the future of heavy industry, were prepared to accept far-reaching worker 
involvement in management in order to garner trade-union support against British plans for 
the break-up of the coal, and iron and steel industries.
54
 Here it has been argued, that 
codetermination was the result of Anglo-German co-operation that fostered solidarity 
between employers and workers, leading to the implementation of a union policy with the 
agreement of the relevant employers.
55
 This thesis is not supported by all writers on the 
subject. For example, Nautz and Hüttenberger argue that the British were not supportive of 
                                                 
51
 Led by E. Potthoff and K. Strohmenger. 
52
 Among the five worker representatives two would be nominated by the works council, 
two by the trade unions and one from another source. See Thum¸ Mitbestimmung, p. 36. 
53
 The 1952 Act provides for codetermination on the supervisory boards of companies with 
more than 500 employees. Employee representatives make up one-third of the members of 
the supervisory board in such cases. The 1951 Act provides for parity codetermination on 
the supervisory boards of the coal, iron and steel industries. 
54
 Müller, Mitbestimmung. See also Thum¸ Mitbestimmung, p. 35 where he summarizes 
letters between industry owners and trade unions offering trade unions shares and 
information and consultation rights in return for their support against British 
decentralization plans. 
55
 W. Hirsch-Weber, Gewerkschaften in der Politik (Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Köln: 
1959), pp. 82 W4. 
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codetermination and, indeed, were pushing instead for the reform of German industrial 
relations to model the British system of free collective bargaining.
56
  
The introduction of codetermination should therefore be seen as a strategic 
mechanism to alter the role of trade unions. Regardless of the underlying British aims, the 
central role played by the British in the creation of codetermination should not be 
overlooked. Harris-Burland, in particular, appears to have played a vital part in introducing 
codetermination. Rennie Smith writes that Harris-BurůĂŶĚǁĂƐĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞdƌĂĚĞ
Unions had an important part to play. As far as he was concerned, he wanted to see them 
ƉůĂǇŝƚ ?,ĞǁĂƐǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞŵĨƵůůǇŝŶƚŽĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?57 Moreover, Harris-Burland viewed 
ƚŚĞƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐ ‘ĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝĞĨƐtabilising influences in the political, social and 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐůŝĨĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŽŶĞ ? ?58 On a broader level, Bernecker, Berghahn, and Müller 
emphasize the positive British attitude towards the very idea of workerƐ ? involvement in 
management, as well as their natural affinity with the social-democratic leadership of the 
German trade unions.
59
 This is perhaps not surprising as similar discussions over 
nationalization and codetermination were taking place in the UK at the same time (see 
below). Arguably, therefore, British intervention created the necessary framework and 
sufficient pressure so that agreement over the concept of codetermination could be 
ƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ ?Ɛ^ĐŚŵŝĚƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ P ‘ƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĂƌŝƚǇĐŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŽŶĂŶĚ
steel industries in February 1947 is therefore the result of trade union pressure for the 
democratizĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĨƵůĨŝůůŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ ? ?60 While the 
introduction of Mitbestimmung can be celebrated as an achievement of the German trade 
unions, it is unlikely that the idea would have come to fruition without the positive support 
                                                 
56
 J. P. Nautz, Die Durchsetzung der Tarifautonomie in Westdeutschland. Das 
Tarifvertragsgesetz vom 9.4.1949  ?WĞƚĞƌ>ĂŶŐ ?&ƌĂŶŬĨƵƌƚĂ ?D ? P ? ? ? ? ) ?W ?,ƺƚƚĞŶďĞƌŐĞƌ ? ‘ŝĞ
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21 (1973), pp. 171 W6. 
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 Rennie Smith, diaries III, entry for 16 W31 December 1946, Bodleian Library. 
58
  ‘/ŶƚĞƌŝŵZĞƉŽƌƚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŵĂĚĞŝŶĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ “^ĞǀĞƌĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ
1947, FO 1039/816, TNA.  
59
 Müller, Mitbestimmung ?t ?> ?ĞƌŶĞĐŬĞƌ ? ‘ŝĞEĞƵŐƌƺŶĚƵŶŐĚĞƌ'ĞǁĞƌŬƐĐŚĂĨƚĞŶŝŶĚĞŶ
Westzonen 1945 W ? ? ? ? ? ? in J. Becker, T. Stammen and P. Waldmann (eds), Vorgeschichte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Fink, München: 1979), pp. 261 W92; V. Berghahn, Unternehmer 
und Politik in der Bundesrepublik (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt: 1985). 
60
 Schmidt, Die verhinderte Neuordnung ?Ɖ ? ? ? P ‘ŝĞŝŶĨƺŚƌƵŶŐĚĞƌƉĂƌŝƚćƚŝƐĐŚĞŶ
Mitbestimmung in den entflochtenen Werken der Eisen-und Stahlindustrie im Februar 1947 
ist also das Resultat des gewerkschaftlichen Drängens auf Demokratisierung der Wirtschaft, 
ĞďĞŶƐŽǁŝĞĚĞƐ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƐĞƐĚĞƌďƌŝƚŝƐĐŚĞŶĞƐĂƚǌƵŶŐƐŵĂĐŚƚ ? ? 
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of the British Labour government which was no stranger to the idea of workerƐ ? involvement 
in the management in nationalized industries. 
 
 
Parallel debates: nationalization and codetermination in UK politics 
 
Nationalization formed a major part of the election manifesto  W Let Us Face the Future61 
drafted by Herbert Morrison with the assistance of Michael Young  W of the Labour 
government that came to power in July 1945. BeƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?ŝƚ ‘ǁĂƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ
for nationalising the Bank of England, coal mining, electricity and gas, the whole railway 
system and a section of road transport, civil aviation and telecommunications, and finally, 
though ineffectually, the major ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽŶĂŶĚƐƚĞĞůŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?62 Nationalization statutes 
were passed in 1946, 1947, and 1948, with little political or public opposition;
63
 the only real 
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ/ƌŽŶĂŶĚ^ƚĞĞůŝůůĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƵŶůŝŬĞĐŽĂůŽƌƚŚĞ
railways, was profitable; for another, it had a tradition of good public relations, and its trade 
ƵŶŝŽŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚƚŽďĞůƵŬĞǁĂƌŵĂďŽƵƚƉƵďůŝĐŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?64 
Nationalization of iron and steel was first proposed in 1946 by John Wilmot, Minister of 
Supply,
65
 but was met with considerable controversy and opposition. It was suggested that 
 ‘ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ “retain the willing co-oƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?ƚŚĞ'overnment should not 
nĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞďƵƚƐŚŽƵůĚŝŵƉŽƐĞĂ “ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?  ?66 Such a compromise was 
favoured by both Wilmot and Morrison, who as Deputy Prime Minister in the Labour 
                                                 
61
 Labour Party, Let Us Face The Future (London: 1945). 
62
 E. Eldon Barry, Nationalisation in British Politics (Jonathan Cape: 1965), p. 369. For a 
detailed account of the various nationalization statutes see R. A. Brady, Crisis in Britain: 
Plans and Achievements of the Labour Government (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
CA: 1950). For a critique of the policies see W. A. Robson, Nationalised Industry and Public 
Ownership (Allen: 1960); S. Pollard, The Development of the British Economy, 1914 W1950 
(Edward Arnold: 1962); R. Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism (Allen and Unwin: 1960).  
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 Nationalization statutes include, inter alia, Bank of England Act 1946, Coal Industry 
Nationalisation Act 1946, Civil Aviation Act 1946, Electricity Act 1947, Transport Act 1947, 
and Gas Act 1948. See Eldon Barry, Nationalisation, at pp. 374 W6 for a discussion of reactions 
to nationalization. 
64
 Pelling, The Labour Governments, p. 83. 
65
 For a more detailed account see ibid., p. 83 onwards. Nationalization of iron and steel was 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ‘ŽǁŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇŽĨƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĞŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞŽĨ
iron and steel from the other activities of the companŝĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ? ? 
66
 Ibid., p. 84. 
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government supervised the implementation of the nationalization programme, but was 
vehemently opposed by the Minister for Health, Aneurin Bevan, who argued in early 
ƐƵŵŵĞƌ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽŝŶƐŝƐƚŽŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŽĨƚŚĞZƵŚƌǁŚŝůĞƌĞƚƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶƐŝĚĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?67 A renewed 
attempt at nationalization was made in 1948 when a Bill prepared bǇtŝůŵŽƚ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌ W
George Strauss  W was introduced in Parliament. Bevin, who spoke out in favour of the Bill, 
adopted a similar argument to Bevan: failure to nationalize the British iron and steel industry 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨƐĞĞŬing to promote the socialisation of the Ruhr 
ƐƚĞĞůŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?68 The Iron and Steel Act was eventually passed in 1949,69 receiving Royal 
Assent on 24 November but, as a compromise, vesting day did not occur until 15 February 
1951, after a general election which was won by the Labour Party with a small majority. 
Unlike the coal industry, the organization of the iron and steel industries was largely left 
intact, but the undertakings were transferred to, and vested in, the Iron and Steel 
Corporation of Great Britain.  
dŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐďĂƐĞĚůĂƌŐĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚFor Socialism and Peace,70 ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞdh ?Ɛ
1944 Interim Report on Post-war Reconstruction.
71
 The issue of labour representation had 
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĚŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŶƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞƐƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?dŚĞdh ?Ɛ
Economic Committee  W composed of a dozen trade-unionists, including Bevin  W together 
with Hugh Dalton and Herbert Morrison as representatives of the Labour Party, had drafted 
ĂƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ŽŶ ‘WƵďůŝĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂŶĚdƌĂĚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ
the question of labour representation on the boards of nationalized industries.
72
 The report 
ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚDŽƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ Wa public corporation where members of the 
board were appointed by the relevant minister from among suitably qualified individuals  W 
which he had attempted to put into practice in the London Passenger Transport Bill, 
                                                 
67
 Ibid., p. 85. 
68
 Ibid., p. 87. 
69
 &ŽƌĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞĐƚƐĞĞ^ ?>ĂŶŐůĞǇ ? ‘dŚĞ/ƌŽŶĂŶĚ^ƚĞĞůĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Economic 
Journal 60 (1950), pp. 311 W22. 
70
 Labour Party, For Socialism and Peace (London: 1934). 
71
 TUC, Interim Report on Post-war Reconstruction (London: 1944). 
72
 TUC, Report on Public Control and Regulation of Industry and Trade (1932), submitted to 
the TUC Congress at Newcastle, 1932. 
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proposed during the last year of the Labour government (1929 W1931) in 1931.73 Morrison 
objected to any form of statutory worker representation on management boards: 
 
I was not convinced that the statutory right of the representation of labour in the 
industry would necessarily provide the best man from the ranks of labour; it would 
involve a difficult and embarrassing business of selection from the names submitted 
by the various Trades Unions in the industry; and if I conceded the statutory right of 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽůĂďŽƵƌŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?/ƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇďĞinvolved in almost 
irresistible demands for the right of representation from other elements of 
interests.
74
 
 
His approach to labour representation had been heavily criticized in 1931 by the TGWU, 
where Bevin, as general secretary, ǁĂƐ ‘ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽard should include 
representatives of labour chosen by the unions concerned, or at least statutory provision for 
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞ ? ?75  
dŚĞƐĂŵĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵĂƌŽƐĞĂŐĂŝŶŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞdh ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĞǀin 
ĂůŽŶĞƐƉŽŬĞŽƵƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĂƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇƚŚĞǁŽƌƐƚĨŽƌŵŽĨƉƵďůŝĐ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ? 76 In doing so, he followed a TUC tradition of advocating worker representation in 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?hŶƚŝů ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞdh ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽƌĚĞƌƐŚĂĚĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ƚŚe General Council [to] 
ĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ?ƉƵďůŝĐŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĂůƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂŶĚŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
with proper provision for the adequate participation of the workers in the control and 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?77 From 1932 onwards, however, reference 
was instead made to the public corporation and the 1931 report was adopted by the 
Congress.
78
 Nonetheless, the issue of worker representation on the boards of nationalized 
                                                 
73
 The Bill was never adopted but a similar Bill  W the London Passenger Transport Act  W was 
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 December 1931. See Bullock, 
Bevin: Trade Union Leader, p. 510. 
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 Annual Report of the Trades 
Union Congress (London, 1932), p. 450. 
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 See Report of the TUC Congress 1932, p. 206. The shift which occurred within the TUC 
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industry continued to arise at subsequent conferences of both the TUC and the Labour 
Party,
79
 with Morrison and Bevin adopting opposing views. Even writing in 1944, Bevin 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝǌĞĚďŽĂƌĚƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚǁŽƌŬĞƌƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ ‘ƵŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƵŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞĂŶĚ
unlikely to pay much attention to the public interest ? ?80 As Bullock explains: 
 
ĞǀŝŶ ?ƐĂŶƚĂŐŽŶŝƐŵƚŽǁĂƌĚƐDŽƌƌŝƐŽŶǁĂƐƵŶĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞĚ ? ?^ŽĐŝĂů ƐŵƚŽĞǀŝŶŵĞĂŶƚ
something more than planning and public ownership; it meant a change in the status 
of the worker, the end of that exclusion from responsibility, the stigma of inferiority, 
which he had always regarded as the key to improving industrial relations.
81
 
 
In arguing in favour of statutory worker representation on management boards, Bevin was 
supported not only by the TGWU but also by the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers 
and Firemen (ASLEF) and the National Union of General and Municipal Workers (NUGMW), 
whose general secretary, Charles Dukes proposed that worker representatives should have a 
statutory right to fill 50% of the members of the boards of management.
82
 As a compromise, 
ŝŶŝƚƐĨŝŶĂůǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ‘ƚŚĂƚǁĂŐĞĞĂƌŶĞƌƐŽĨĂůů
grades and occupations have a right which should be acknowledged by law to an effective 
share in the control and direction of socialiseĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŝƌůĂďŽƵƌƐƵƐƚĂŝŶƐ ? ?83  
The same questions over labour representation arose after the Second World War. 
However, the position adopted by the TUC and the Labour Party remained virtually 
unchanged from its pre-war position. As Dartmann points out: 
 
/ŶƚŚĞĞŶĚ ? ? ?ŝŶƐƉŝƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨůĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ
the control and administration of industry had started with economic and industrial 
developments, and in spite of the fact that therefore economic and industrial 
development, control of industry, and labour participation were generically linked, 
this link was argumentatively reduced to the question of efficient management. 
Efficiency became the major yardstick for the eventual success of nationalisation and 
                                                 
79
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sŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ‘ĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?ǁĂƐŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƌĞĚƵĐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
skills of the persons in charge, and consequently became the slogan with which the 
promoters of the public corporation rejected any claim for labour participation.
84
 
 
In its Interim Report on Post-war Reconstruction, the TUC confirmed that nationalized 
industries were to take on the legal form of public corporations ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘[T]rade unions 
shall maintain their complete independence. They can hardly do so if they are compromised 
ŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽŽĂƌĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽďĞŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐďǇ
ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŵ ? ?85  
With hindsight it is clĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚƌĂĚĞ-ƵŶŝŽŶĂŶĚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ
in the maŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂŶŝƐƐƵĞŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞdhŚĂĚ
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ? ?86 This contradiction is 
ĂůƐŽŽďǀŝŽƵƐŝŶƚŚĞdh ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚǁŚĞŶ ?ĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞĂƐƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐǁŽƌŬĞƌ
participatiŽŶŝŶŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŝƚĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐůŝĨĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ‘ƚŚĞƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨĂŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶĨĞůůƐŚŽƌƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĂŝŵĂnd, in 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚDŽƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇ PŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐďŽĂƌĚƐŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐǁĞƌĞ
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚďǇĂŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ‘ĨƌŽŵĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐŚĂĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ ?ĂŶĚŚĂǀŝŶŐ
shown capacity in, industrial commercial or financial matters, applied science, 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ?87 Any board members drawn from the trade-
ƵŶŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚǁĞƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĂŶǇƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŚĞůĚŝŶ ?ŽƌĂŶǇĨŽƌŵĂů
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ ?ƚŚĞdƌĂĚĞhŶŝŽŶ ?88 in order to preserve trade-union independence,89 which 
would in turn ensure freedom of action in collective bargaining.  
While nationalized industries were under a duty to establish machinery for the 
settlement of terms and conditions of employment, the wording of the relevant provisions 
was so vague that the obligation should be considered as good practice rather than a legal 
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requirement to engage in effective collective bargaining.
90
 ƐƐƵĐŚ ? ‘ƚŚĞŽŶůǇƌĞĂůĐůĂŝŵƚŽ
innovation in industrial relations in the nationalized industries can be found in the field of 
ũŽŝŶƚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?91 in the form of joint production boards, which were under a statutory 
obligation to consult with relevant trade unions on the establishment of permanent 
consultation machinery for safety, health, and welfare issues. Davies and Freedland suggest 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŝƐĨŽƌŵŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞdhƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ
control of the unions, did not embrace the matters that were central to collective bargaining 
ĂŶĚĚŝĚŶŽƚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚŚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ ? ?92 Apart from failing to guarantee 
the involvement of workers or their representatives in the regulation of nationalized 
industry, the proposed legal form  W the public corporation -  ‘ƌƵůĞĚŽƵƚ ?ĂŶǇĚŝƌĞĐƚ
accountability of the board members (or even of some of them) to the workers employed in 
the industry, let alone any election by the workers of directors to the board of the 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?93  
Signs of discontent among trade unions and some Labour Party members over the 
absence of workerƐ ? representation in the nationalized industries resurfaced after 1946,94 
ǁŚĞŶ ‘ĂŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĨŽƌĚŝƌĞĐƚǁŽƌŬĞƌƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?95 ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƌĞŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƚŚĞdh ?Ɛ
Brighton congress ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƉƌĞƐƐĞĚƵƉŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐ
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶĂƚĂůůůĞǀĞůƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?96 At the 
1947 congress, a resolution was passed unanimously which demanded full participation by 
workers, through their trade unions, in the management of nationalized industries.
97
 At the 
>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚǁŚŝĐŚĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨ
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝƌƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶt of 
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ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂƚĂůůůĞǀĞůƐ ?ƚŽ ?ďĞĨŝƌŵůǇĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?98 ŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐ
the negation first of all of Socialism and secondly of sanity itself to nationalise an industry 
and then leave the control of it in the hands of the ToriĞƐ ? ?99 Moreover it was argued that: 
 
Something more than consultation must be given to the men. They should have the 
opportunity of appointment to managerial and supervisory positions. Only in that 
way are we going to get co-operation between the managerial and supervisory side 
and those who are supervised.
100
 
 
The Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen, in seconding the resolution, 
argued that: 
 
 ?d ?ŽŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĂŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐŝŶŐŝƚ ? ?tĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚ
the extension of the principle of industrial democracy is just as important as the 
ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?/ŶƵƌŐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚ
industry should participate in management we do so because we believe that that is 
fundamental for industrial democracy and will increase production.
101
 
 
Morrison expressed the views of the government when he disagreed with the tenor of the 
ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶďǇĐĂůůŝŶŐĨŽƌŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐƚŽďĞŐŝǀĞŶ ‘ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƚŝŵĞƚŽĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞ ?ƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ?ƚŽ
make efficient or more efficient the industries which have been socialised in the present 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?102 Thus the National Union of Mineworkers argued that: 
 
tĞĂƐĂŵŝŶĞƌƐ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĚŽŶŽƚǁĂŶƚƚŽŚĂǀĞƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞƌŝĚŝĐƵůŽƵƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
that we see on the Continent where the ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽƌƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨĂŵŝŶĞƌƐ ?
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organization is also on the Coal Board running the industry, so that he has on 
occasion to pass a resolution to ask himself to give himself something.
103
 
 
^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ƚŚĞd'thĨŽůůŽǁĞĚDŽƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐůŝŶĞŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐďǇƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞŚĂǀĞŚĂĚ
ĞŝŐŚƚĞĞŶŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌƵŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐĞĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?tŝƚŚƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ
purpose of the resolution I am in full sympathy and full support, but you have to walk before 
ǇŽƵĐĂŶƌƵŶ ? ?104 It was agreed instead that the matter would be remitted to the Labour 
WĂƌƚǇ ?ƐǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĨŽƌ ‘ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞdƌĂĚĞƐhŶŝŽŶŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ? ?105 
The issue of codetermination in management of nationalized industries was also 
raised by a number of trade unions with various government departments, and directly with 
the Prime Minister. A letter written by the National Union of Railwaymen in 1950 to the 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨdƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚŽƉŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ
should have a greater participation in the managemeŶƚŽĨƚŚĞZĂŝůǁĂǇƐ ? ?106 The TGWU  W 
which had originally opposed the 1948 resolution  W in a letter dated 21 September 1951 
ƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞĚ ‘ƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚŝŶŐŝǀŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨƉƵďůŝĐŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉĨƵůůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ
should be taken of the knowledge, skill and experience of the workers and that in all 
appointments made in the nationalized industries proper regard should be had [to suitably 
ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ? ?107 /ŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ
circumstances no action is necessary, but that after the Election whoever is Secretary of the 
Socialisation of Industries Committee might then consider whether this is a matter to be 
ƉůĂĐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ?108 The general election of 1951 was however won by the 
Conservative Party, and the new government privatized the iron and steel industry in 1953.  
 
 
Industrial democracy  W different meanings  
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Thus in Germany, codetermination was introduced without nationalization, whereas in the 
UK nationalization was implemented without codetermination. This contrast was in part the 
result of a difference in the understanding of industrial democracy and of the role of trade 
unions.
109
 The concept of industrial democracy was first explored by Beatrice and Sidney 
Webb who argued that industrial democracy should be understood in a two-fold manner:
110
 
first, it has an internal dimension which refers to trade-union democracy,
111
 and, second, it 
has an external dimension which they understood as effective collective bargaining.
112
 
Although the Webbs later included an element of workerƐ ? representation in management in 
their understanding of industrial democracy,
113
 this was merged with the idea of public 
ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƐDĐ'ĂƵŐŚĞǇƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚ ?ƚŚĞtĞďď ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ‘ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚŽŶĞŵŽĚĞůŽĨ
governance for all types of enterprise, as if one size might fit all. To socialise economic 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǇƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŝƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐĞŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?114  
Clegg elaborates three principles underpinning industrial democracy which, according 
to him, crystallized in the inter-war years: first, trade unions must be independent of the 
state; second, trade unions can only represent the industrial interests of workers; and, third, 
the ownership of industries is irrelevant to good industrial relations.
115
 Similar to the Webbs, 
Clegg argues that workerƐ ? representation in management or their involvement in the 
control of industry does not therefore form a fundamental underpinning of industrial 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂŶĚŝƐŝŶĚĞĞĚ ‘ƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ ? as it threatens trade-union independence.116 Such a 
view clearly underpins the arguments for and against nationalization and the introduction of 
codetermination in the UK throughout the 1940s. Thus the main argument in favour of 
workerƐ ?ŽƌƚƌĂĚĞ-unionƐ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞh< ‘ǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶƐŝŶ
the industry would thereby take their share of managerial responsibility for the industry but 
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that those involved in making the managerial decisions would have a sympathetic 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ?117 This 
would however threaten trade-unionƐ ? independence from the state and thereby restrict 
their ability to engage in free collective bargaining. As Chester explains: 
 
The Unions did not want this, any more than did management, for their basic 
purpose was to bargain about wages and conditions. If they were part of 
management they would be bargaining with themselves, in other words, so far as the 
men were concerned they would be indistinguishable from management.
118
 
 
Francis argues in a similar vein by suggesting that:  
 
Union leaders saw nationalization as a means to pursue a more advantageous 
position within a framework of continued conflict, rather than as an opportunity to 
replace the old adversarial form of industrial relations. Moreover, most workers in 
nationalized industries exhibited an essentially instrumentalist attitude, favouring 
public ownership because it secured job security and improved wages rather than 
because it promised the creation of a new set of socialist relationships in the 
workplace.
119
 
 
Codetermination in any form was not therefore seen as a desirable option for many in the 
Labour Party or among the majority of trade-unionists. Only Bevin seemed to approach 
industrial democracy from a different perspective when he argued in favour of workers 
being given increased responsibility in the management of their place of work. For the 
majority of the Labour Party, nationalization was regarded as sufficient to guarantee 
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽĨĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? 
The concept of industrial democracy was translated in Germany as 
Wirtschaftsdemokratie by Naphtali writing in the 1920s. It was understood as the equivalent 
ŽĨƚŚĞtĞďď ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞŝƚǁĂƐŝŶĨĂĐƚǀĞƌǇ
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different. Thus Wirtschaftsdemokratie was defined  aƐ ‘ĂĨŽƌŵŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?Ă
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂƵƚŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?The nature of 
ƚŚŝƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇƉƌĞƐƵŵĞƐĐŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?120 German trade unions understood this as 
turning industrial servants into industrial citizens,
121
 which meant that capital and labour 
should be equals in the running of businesses. The reason given for this approach was that 
 ‘ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĂŶĚƉƌŽƉĞƌŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŚŝƐ
employer are at least as important as those of the employer and certainly more important 
ƚŚĂŶƚŚŽƐĞŽĨŵĞƌĞƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ?122 German trade unions thus associated codetermination 
with equality of workers and employers in the management of enterprises as well as offering 
the possibility of control of the employers coupled with the need to be involved in the 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƚĞƌŵƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ? Codetermination was 
considered as separate from and in addition to nationalization.
123
 Historical factors also 
played a role in GeƌŵĂŶƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĞŵďƌĂĐĞŽĨĐŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?Ɛ
Dartmann explains: 
 
 ?d ?ŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽǁĞĚŝƚƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŵĂŝŶůǇƚŽƚŚĞ
interpretation of the rise of Hitler the unions arrived at immediately after the war, in 
which they blamed big business alone and therefore uncritically failed to provide an 
assessment of their own roles in the critical period leading to the Third Reich.
124
 
 
The introduction of codetermination in and of itself was therefore considered a success by 
German trade unions, whereas from the perspective of the British military government, 
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influenced by a different understanding of industrial democracy, it was a stepping stone on 
the road to nationalization which, in Germany, was never completed. 
Against this background, one must question whether the failure to institute a system 
of codetermination in the UK should be considered a missed opportunity for British trade 
ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?&ƌĂŶĐĞƐK ?'ƌĂĚǇ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨƚŚĞdh ?ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽĂŶƐǁĞƌ
this question in the affirmative when she argues that: 
 
Arguably unions in this country [in the 1980s] were reaping the consequences of a 
strategic error made in failing to seize the opportunity of the European model of 
codetermination and industrial democracy. Ernest Bevin was acutely aware of the 
German system. As Foreign Secretary he played a large part in creating it. But alas not 
here. In 1945, we had an important opportunity to lift our gaze beyond the 
immediate task of improving terms and conditions and play a different role within the 
emerging mixed economy: giving workers a voice and a stake in strategic decision 
making, in the newly nationalised industries and the new welfare state. But it was 
one that we squandered. Rather than rising to the profound challenge of collective 
ownership  W not just redistributing power to workers, but also to those who 
depended on the goods and services we produced  W we chose instead to take the 
easy option.
125
 
 
Indeed, the absence of codetermination is increasingly bemoaned in the UK. Frances 
K ?'ƌĂĚǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƐƚŚĂƚƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐƐŚŽƵůĚ ‘ĞŵďƌĂĐĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂŶĚƚĂŬĞƵƉ
every chance to re-ƐŚĂƉĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ? ?^ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ
demands economic democracy, a recalibration of the relationship between capital and 
ůĂďŽƵƌ ? ?/ŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƐƵĐŚƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?ƐŚĞƌĞǀĞƌƚƐƚŽƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƚƌĂĚe-ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
of industrial democracy: 
 
[I]ndustrial democracy poses a challenge to us in the trade union movement. It implies a 
role that is not just more ambitious, but more demanding, than the one we usually have 
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now. It means accepting responsibility, moving out of a comfort zone of short-termism, 
to taking the long view and championing the greater good.
126
 
 
tŝƚŚŚŝŶĚƐŝŐŚƚ ?ƌŝƚŝƐŚƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĞŵďƌĂĐĞĐodetermination can be considered 
a short-sighted, if not necessarily surprising, approach to industrial relations. As Fox points 
ŽƵƚ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚůĂďŽƵƌŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ ‘ĂƌĞĨŽƌŵŝƐƚůĂďŽƵƌŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŝƚŚŝƚƐŽǁŶĚĞĞƉ
interests in the existing order, constitutes one of the major blockages to radical social 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?127 ĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĐŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚĞĚĂ ‘ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
ƐŚŝĨƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞůĂďŽƵƌŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚǁŚŝch significant numbers of trade-union and 
Labour Party leaders were ŶŽƚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐĂ ‘ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƵĂů ?ƚŽĂ ‘ĐŽ-
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?128 Ultimately, it is clear that Labour, in its nationalization programme in 
ƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ǁĂƐ ‘ƵŶĂďůĞƚŽĂŐƌĞĞŽŶǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ P
 ?ĂŵĞĂŶƐƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂŶĚŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Žƌ ?ĂƚŽŽůƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ
ĂĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨĐůĂƐƐƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?129  
From an ideological perspective, there was a clash within the Labour movement 
throughout the 1930s and early 1940s between, on the one hand, Fabianism
130
  W 
represented by large parts of the Labour Party  W and, on the other hand, Guild Socialism131  W 
ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĂŵŽŶŐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌĚŝƌĞĐƚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?
control in nationalized industries by the Labour Party in its 1945 manifesto represents a clear 
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ŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞ “ĐŽ- ƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐƉƵƌƐƵĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
constructive collaboration with employer and government, and depends less upon 
ŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ? 
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 ‘swing away from the syndicalist content of socialist thinking in the direction of Fabian 
ŝĚĞĂƐ ? ?132 ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ? ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂĐƚƐŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ
specified in Let Us Face the Future were all based primarily on the need to release 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞĞŶĞƌŐŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚĚŽƌŵĂŶƚƵŶĚĞƌƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?133 The only 
exception to this was found in the iron and steel industry which had performed well under 
private ownership, thus making nationalization on purely economic grounds difficult to 
justify. The rationale was instead given as power;
134
 ƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚďĞŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƚĞĞů
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?135 Nonetheless, 
nationalization of these industries faced considerably more opposition. It must be 
questioned whether this would have been different had nationalization been justified on the 
grounds of empowering workers to share in certain responsibilities for the management of 
these industries.  
British trade unions, for the most part, also did not share the same level of distrust of 
employers and the state as German trade unions after the Second World War. This is partly 
explained by British Guild Socialism which bore littlĞƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞĂŶƚŝ-state 
ǀŝĞǁƐŽĨŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂů ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ?ƐǇŶĚŝĐĂůŝƐƚŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?136 The state was perceived in the 
h< ?ƵŶůŝŬĞŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ĂƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ĂŶŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚŽĨĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ? ?137 Nonetheless, 
trade-ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ŶĂƌƌŽǁǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŝƌƐƚďĞĐĂŵĞ obvious when industries were privatized after the 
change of government in 1951, leaving workers with no role in the management of industry. 
Even in those industries which were not immediately privatized, the selection of board 
members was left to the individual minister concerned, thereby providing no guarantee that 
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚ ?^ƵĐŚĂƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŚĂĚďĞĞŶĨŽƌĞƐĞĞŶďǇƚŚŽƐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
union movement arguing in favour of worker participation in management;
138
 considered as 
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 ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĂůŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ?ƵŶƚŽůĚŚĂƌŵĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ
control over industry were to fall into the hands of an anti-ƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?139 Such 
arguments were however routinely defeated.
140
 
Finally, the central role of collective laissez-faire
141
 in the historical development of 
British labour law undoubtedly played a role in trade-ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌ
collective bargaining as the mechanism to regulate worker Wemployer relations. However, in 
order for such an approach to succeed, industrial autonomy of employers and trade unions, 
and equilibrium between both parties, must be guaranteed. Once the autonomy of either 
party is undermined, through, for example, state intervention in industrial relations, 
collective bargaining as an effective mechanism for the governance of workplace relations 
can no longer exist. The changes in inter alia industrial structure and increasing regulation of 
industrial relations through law during the second half of the twentieth century has 
illustrated the weakness of the voluntarist approach:
142
 without an institutionalized role in 
the management of industry, such as in Germany, British trade unions rely primarily on 
industrial strength in order to represent workers. Although union density
143
 is higher in the 
UK (26%) than in Germany (18%), German trade unions have greater influence in the 
regulation of the individual employment relationship through, inter alia, alternative 
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Annual Conference Report, 1932, pp. 212 W214 and pp. 221 W223; the Labour Party Annual 
Conference Report 1933, p. 208; Morrison, Socialisation, chs 10 W1 ? ?ŽůĞ ? ‘^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚŽŶƚƌŽů
ŽĨ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ?' ? ?, ?ŽůĞ ?The Next Ten Years in British Social and Economic 
Policy (Macmillan: 1929), chs 7 and 8.  
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 O. Kahn-&ƌĞƵŶĚ ? ‘>ĂďŽƵƌ>Ăǁ ? ?ŝŶidem, O. Kahn-Freund: Selected Writings (Stevens), p. 8; 
Davies and Freedland, Labour Legislation, ch. 1; see also K. D. Ewing ? ‘dŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞĂŶĚ
/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?HSIR 5 (1998), pp. 1 W31, p. 1.  
142
 This is also argued by Chris Howell in C. Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The 
Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain, 1890 W2000 (Princeton University 
Press, NJ and Oxford: 2005), ch. 5. 
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 Union density  W defined as the proportion of employees who are union members  W is only 
one way of measuring union strength. However, it is considered a key indicator of this. For 
data on German union density see the ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 
1960 and 2012 compiled by J. Visser, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
(AIAS), Version 4, April 2013 University of Amsterdam (see http://www.uva-aias.net/207 ). 
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mechanisms to collective bargaining,
144
 such as codetermination, which are guaranteed by 
legislation.
145
 One can therefore only conclude that the failure to institute a system of 
codetermination in the UK in the 1940s should be considered a missed opportunity for 
British trade unions. 
In conclusion, the nationalization programme of the British post-war Labour 
government had a profound effect on German industrial relations; creating the necessary 
framework within which parity codetermination could be introduced. While nationalization 
in the German iron and steel industries was never achieved, codetermination has had a 
lasting and substantial impact on German trade unions and on the German labour law 
system. Parallels can be drawn with debates taking place at the same time in the UK over 
nationalization and workerƐ ? participation in management. However, historical differences 
between the British and German trade-union movements, as well as differences in the 
understanding of industrial democracy, resulted in the nationalization of the major 
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞh<ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂnagement of these industries. 
With the benefit of hindsight and in light of the changes that occurred in the regulation of 
British industrial relations in the second half of the twentieth century, the failure to institute 
a system of codetermination in the UK in the late 1940s must be considered a missed 
opportunity for British trade unions. 
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 Even in the case of collective bargaining, however, Germany has a higher level of 
coverage due to industry-level bargaining than the UK, where collective bargaining takes 
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